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EVOLVING SCIENCE MEETS THE STAGNATING APPEALS 
PROCESS: INTEGRATING DAUBERT INTO THE POST-TRIAL 
PHASE 
Jacey Smith* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Dr. James Grigson, also known as “Doctor Death,” testified at the
sentencing phases of over 100 convicted murderers in Texas.1  He did 
so until 1995, when he was expelled from the American Psychiatric 
Association.2  His testimony at most of these dispositions was that the 
defendant, unless put to death, would kill again.3  This type of 
testimony, often provided by forensic psychologists such as Dr. 
Grigson, is styled in death penalty cases as “future dangerousness,” 
evidence which tends to predict a defendant’s risk of violence upon 
reentry into society.4   
One such trial in which Dr. Death testified was the trial of Mr. 
Randall Dale Adams, a twenty-eight-year-old man wrongly convicted 
of shooting a police officer in Dallas, Texas, in 1977.5  In that case, 
sixteen-year-old David Harris picked Adams up in a stolen vehicle on 
November 27, 1976.6  The two spent the day together doing 
recreational drugs and drinking alcohol, and later, Harris dropped 
Adams off at a motel.7  Thereafter, Harris was pulled over by Officer 
* Law Clerk at the Baltimore County State’s Attorney’s Office.  J.D. Candidate, May
2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., Classical Studies, 2015, The
College of William and Mary.  The author would like to specially thank Professor
John Bessler for his valuable feedback and guidance, Kelly Goebel and Megan
Micco for being fearless leaders, as well as the ones who got her here, her family.
1. Texas ‘Dr. Death’ Retires After 167 Capital Case Trials, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2003), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/dec/20/20031220-113219-5189
r/.
2. Id.
3. See id. (“In more than 100 of the 167 capital cases in which he was involved, he
testified strongly that a defendant would kill again if given the opportunity . . . .”).
4. See Mark Douglas Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Capital Offenders in Texas
Prisons: Rates, Correlates, and an Actuarial Analysis of Violent Misconduct, 31
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 553–55 (2007).
5. Alexandra Gross, Randall Dale Adams, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://ww
w.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=2984 (last
updated Sept. 23, 2014).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Robert Wood because he had been driving with no headlights.8  
Harris shot Officer Wood at least four times and sped away.9  He 
later pinned the murder on Adams, his companion earlier in the day.10  
At Adams’s sentencing, before the jury, Dr. Grigson testified as an 
expert witness, stating: “I would place Mr. Adams at the very 
extreme, worse or severe end of the scale.  You can’t get beyond that.  
There is nothing known in the world today that is going to change 
this man; we don’t have anything.”11 
It appears this testimony, among other factors, caused the jury to 
sentence Adams to death.12  After being confined on death row for 
twelve years, Adams was exonerated in 1989, when local attorneys 
took an interest in his case.13  During a three-day hearing on his 
motion for a new trial, Adams’s attorneys argued that the State had 
committed prosecutorial misconduct, withheld exculpatory evidence, 
knowingly allowed its witnesses to perjure themselves, and convicted 
Adams with insufficient evidence.14  Additionally, Harris later 
recanted his statement against Adams.15  After the hearing, the court 
granted Adams’s motion, and the State thereafter dismissed all 
charges.16  Fortunately, due to other errors in Adams’s trial, he was 
exonerated.17 
Adams walked out of prison; he was free.18  Yet in his case, a 
doctor took the stand in front of a jury and confidently testified with 
100% certainty that Adams would kill again.19  This so-called 
“scientific evidence” admitted at Adams’s trial, while perhaps 
considered acceptable in 1977, certainly would be considered suspect 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Future Dangerousness Predictions Wrong
95% of the Time: New Study on Capital Trials Exposes Widespread Unreliable
Testimony, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1099 [hereinafter Future
Dangerousness Predictions Wrong].
12. Gross, supra note 5.
13. See id.  Adams was exonerated in part because of publicity his case received from a
notable documentary, The Thin Blue Line.  See Douglas Martin, Randall Adams, 61,
Dies; Freed with Help of Film, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.co
m/2011/06/26/us/26adams.html.
14. See Gross, supra note 5.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.  Mr. Adams was eventually released on
grounds unrelated to the testimony of Dr. Grigson.  See infra note 168 and
accompanying text.  I argue that he should have been granted a different kind of
remedy based upon Dr. Grigson’s questionable testimony.  See infra Part IV.
18. See Gross, supra note 5.
19. See id.
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today,20 especially in light of Dr. Grigson’s expulsion from the 
American Psychiatric Association for his inaccurate predictions of 
“future dangerousness” predicated solely on hypotheticals.21 
This Comment proposes a procedural mechanism stemming from 
the executive branch, rather than the judiciary, as a solution to the 
quandary in which Adams found himself:22 sitting in prison for a 
conviction with a sentence that is materially supported by suspect 
scientific evidence.23  This mechanism would introduce the Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.24 (Daubert) standard of
admission of scientific evidence into a convicted defendant’s post-
trial proceedings.25  Using this mechanism, a defendant would have a
chance to challenge the validity of suspect scientific evidence, that if
scrutinized by the modern scientific community, would not meet the
Daubert standard.26  This Comment will focus on the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and defendants being held in federal custody
only, as an example of a workable mechanism which states could
choose to adapt to fit their own post-trial procedure.27
20. The future dangerousness test today is a highly controversial topic, with an
increasing number of studies and reports showing its potential weaknesses.  See, e.g.,
Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 4; James W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the
Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 449, 458 (1989); Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, What One Hand
Giveth, the Other Taketh Away: How Future Dangerousness Corrupts Guilt Verdicts
and Produces Premature Punishment Decisions in Capital Cases, 32 PACE L. REV.
447, 451 (2012); 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 11:11, Westlaw (database updated Dec.
2016) (“Practically no research exists on the interrater reliability of descriptions of
personality and psychopathology made by psychologists using projective
techniques.”); Future Dangerousness Predictions Wrong, supra note 11 (“The
American Psychiatric Association has stated since 1983 that ‘[t]he unreliability of
psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established
fact within the profession.’”).  Only four states consider the assessment of future
dangerousness in capital sentencing mandatory, and in twelve states, future
dangerousness is permissive.  Mark D. Cunningham et al., Capital Jury Decision-
Making: The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL’Y, & L. 223, 225 (2009).
21. Kristine Phillips, In Texas, a Man Who Didn’t Kill Anybody Is About to Be Executed
for Murder, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/p
ost-nation/wp/2016/08/12/in-texas-a-man-who-didnt-kill-anybody-is-about-to-be-ex
ecuted-for-murder/?utm_term=.0cdebfe812d4.
22. See infra Section IV.A.
23. See Gross, supra note 5.
24. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
25. See infra Section IV.B.2.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Section II.B.
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First, this Comment will examine the current state of the law, 
delving into the pretrial standards of admissibility of scientific 
evidence, then highlighting federal post-trial procedure generally.28  
Next, this Comment will propose a mechanism through the executive 
branch to challenge the validity of scientific methodology material to 
the defendant’s conviction that could be filed after all judicial 
procedural remedies have been exhausted.29  The passage of time 
would serve as a way for petitioners to revisit the science in their 
convictions after new technology has evolved and old scholarship has 
been discarded.30  This could protect a defendant in Adams’s shoes, 
that is, a person in jail whose sentence or conviction, once supported 
by Daubert approved science, now hinges on suspicious science.31 
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Because this Comment will propose a hearing in the post-trial 
phase that incorporates important characteristics of the pretrial 
Daubert hearing, it is necessary to detail the essence of Daubert.32  
By analyzing how scientific evidence is handled pretrial, a parallel of 
how it could be done in the post-trial phase may be drawn.33 
A. Pretrial Determination of the Validity of Scientific Evidence
The predominant common law test of admissibility of scientific 
evidence was introduced in 1923 in the landmark case Frye v. United 
States.34  The scientific methodology at issue in Frye was a “systolic 
blood pressure deception test,” which was akin to an early form of a 
lie detector test.35  However, the Frye Court noted that “when a 
scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.”36  This 
was a novel opinion because it distinguished a previously established 
scientific methodology from cutting edge technology.37  This 
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Section IV.B.1.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Section II.A.
33. See infra Section II.A.
34. See 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35. Id. at 1014 (“[T]he theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without
conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort,
which is reflected in the blood pressure.”).
36. Id.
37. Id. (“Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
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distinction is the common thread that runs from Frye to modern 
scientific evidence jurisprudence.38 
The brief 1923 opinion developed into what became known as the 
“‘general acceptance’ test” of scientific methodology, which 
permeated the common law both federally and in the states for 
seventy years.39  A Frye hearing at its very essence determines 
whether the proffered testimony is “generally accepted in the 
particular field in which it belongs.”40   
This test is indisputably vague.41  The actual case, concise and 
without citation, does not provide for a specific procedural 
mechanism.42  Rather, it established a broad framework of inquiry 
that a court should follow before admitting scientific evidence.43  
After Frye, most states followed a two-step inquiry.44  First, the 
courts identified the relevant field under which the evidence would 
fall.45  Second, the court determined whether the particular 
methodology had been generally accepted within that relevant 
scientific field.46  
Because of the lack of specificity that the Frye case bequeathed to 
the courts, states began to examine factors that could help them 
determine the reliability of the disputed evidence.47  Factors the states 
employed included the following: the methodology’s acceptance in 
the scientific field,48 the qualifications of the expert,49 the technique’s 
general use compared to its specific use in the case at issue,50 the 
potential error rate,51 the availability of literature and research 
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”). 
38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
39. Id. at 585.
40. 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:5, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016).
41. Id.
42. Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14; FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 40, § 1:5.
43. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 40, § 1:5.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. John W. Parry, Expert Evidence and Testimony: Daubert Versus Frye, 28 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 136, 136 n.10 (citing JACK 
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE §§ 702–03, 708–19
(1987)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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relating to the technique,52 the novelty of the technique,53 and the 
degree to which the technique’s interpretation relied upon the 
expert’s subjective opinion.54  
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence codified a different 
procedure for the admission of expert testimony.55  The original text 
of Rule 702 read: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”56 
Rule 702 allowed a more lenient entrance for scientific evidence 
into the courtroom than Frye.57  What was missing from the Federal 
Rule was the requirement that a methodology be “generally 
accepted” within the scientific community.58  Members of the jury, as 
the triers of fact, could determine the weight of the evidence 
themselves, thereby diminishing the trial judge’s prior role as a 
“gatekeeper” in determining the reliability of the evidence in the 
relevant scientific community.59  Because the Federal Rule’s advisory 
committee notes and legislative history were silent on Frye, the 
debate over whether Rule 702 overruled Frye brewed in the legal 
community until the seminal Supreme Court case of Daubert.60  
Daubert finally determined that Rule 702 had superseded Frye’s 
general acceptance test for admissibility of scientific evidence.61  The 
Daubert Court came to this conclusion, holding that “a rigid ‘general 
acceptance’ requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of 
the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the 
traditional barriers to “opinion” testimony.’”62 
A similarity between the old Frye standard and Daubert’s 
definition of Rule 702 is that both allow the judge to serve a 
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (amended 2000).
56. Id.
57. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
6267, at 306 (2016).
58. Richard B. Racine et al., The Battle over Science in the Courtroom: Can a Balance
Be Found When Applying the Gatekeeping Principles of the Supreme Court’s
Daubert Decision?, 42 FED. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 36, 38.
59. Id.
60. Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner,
Kumho Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Buying This?, 33 UWLA L.
REV. 87, 93 (2001).
61. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
62. Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
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“gatekeeping role” in the admission of scientific evidence.63  Daubert 
requires a judge to determine that the scientific evidence sought to be 
introduced is relevant and reliable.64  Daubert provides suggestions 
for how courts should evaluate scientific evidence to determine its 
reliability as an alternative to the strict “general acceptance” test.65  
The recommended list includes:   
(1) [W]hether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has
been tested––that is, whether the expert’s theory can be
challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead
simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the
technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community.66
After Daubert, the existing Federal Rule was reworked to match 
the case’s holding.67  Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now reads:  
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.68
63. Id. at 596.
64. Id. at 589.
65. Id. at 593–94; FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
66. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
67. Id.  This amendment is also based in part on the holding of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, in which the Supreme Court held that the “basic gatekeeping
obligation” applied to “all expert testimony,” rather than just scientific testimony.
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
68. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Furthermore, the Daubert Court held that Rule 702 does not 
preclude the testimony of two experts who may have drawn two 
different conclusions using the same methodology, stating that “[t]he 
focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not 
on the conclusions that they generate.”69  The Court also held that the 
burden of proof in a Daubert hearing is incumbent upon the 
proponent of the witness to show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, first, that the expert is qualified to testify as such, and 
second, that the witness’s opinions are both relevant and reliable.70  
Having surveyed the procedure of pretrial determinations of the 
admission and exclusion of scientific evidence, an examination of 
post-trial procedure is necessary to determine where and how a 
Daubert-style hearing would play out in the post-trial phase.71 
B. Post-Trial Procedure
Federally, a criminal defendant has an array of appeals and 
collateral attacks that he may use to argue the validity of his 
conviction or sentence.72  Generally, a convicted defendant’s first 
attack must be done on direct appeal.73  The federal circuit courts 
must hear appeals from all final decisions of the federal district 
courts.74  
Generally, the next step for a defendant is to appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.75  28 U.S.C. § 2106 provides:   
69. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95.
70. Id. at 592–93, 592 n.10; DANA G. DEATON: THE DAUBERT CHALLENGE TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 3, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017).
71. See infra Section II.B; see also infra Part IV (proposing a procedural mechanism for
post-trial criminal procedure).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32–38 (providing post-conviction
procedures).
73. NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 29:13 (2d ed.), Westlaw
(database updated June 2017).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).  This provision states:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, 
the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, 
the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme 
Court.  The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described 
in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title. 
   Id. 
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012).
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The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate 
jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse 
any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought 
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct 
the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or 
require such further proceedings to be had as may be just 
under the circumstances.76   
Review on a writ of certiorari is subject to judicial discretion and 
not an automatic right, and thus will only be granted for “compelling 
reasons.”77  
After a convicted defendant has exhausted his direct appellate 
remedies, the next step is to attack his conviction collaterally.78  
There are strong interests in both preserving the finality of judgments 
and in maintaining orderly trial procedure.79  These interests “must be 
overcome before collateral relief can be justified.”80  
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Section 2255) is the overarching statute by 
which a petitioner may move the court on collateral grounds to 
reconsider his conviction.81  The remedies available to a petitioner, if 
successful under a Section 2255 claim, include release, a new trial, or 
the court may vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.82 
A petitioner seeking a remedy pursuant to Section 2255 has three 
broad grounds by which he may collaterally attack his conviction.83  
The prisoner “must allege as a basis for relief: (1) an error of 
constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory 
limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to 
render the entire proceeding invalid.”84  If the claim is not one of 
constitutional significance, the petitioner must show that there are 
76. Id.
77. SUP. CT. R. 10.
78. COHEN, supra note 73, § 29:13.  A collateral attack is “a tactic whereby a party seeks
to circumvent an earlier ruling of one court by filing a subsequent action in another
court.”  21A TRACY BATEMAN ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYER’S EDITION §
51:221, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017).
79. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 n.13 (1977).
80. Id.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
82. Id. § 2255(a)–(b).
83. Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006).
84. Id. (citation omitted).  For an explanation of why part (3) of this framework is
inapplicable to the proposal in this Comment, see Part III.
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“‘exceptional circumstances’ that make the need for redress 
evident.”85   
If seeking relief under Section 2255, allegations of error regarding 
trial court procedure, such as sufficiency of the evidence to support 
conviction, grand jury issues, or other general trial procedure 
mistakes which constitute errors of constitutional dimension, will not 
be reviewed by the collateral court.86  Commonly attempted, but 
generally unsuccessful, claims made pursuant to Section 2255 
include attacking the petitioner’s charging document or the admission 
of certain evidence at trial.87  Types of successful claims cognizable 
under Section 2255 include attacks on effectiveness of counsel 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment,88 the validity of a guilty plea,89 
and constitutionally deficient jury instructions.90   
In addition to the claims of constitutional dimension that can be 
brought pursuant to Section 2255, if a petitioner can prove that he is 
actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, he will be 
exempted from the general procedural bar against claims that should 
have been raised on direct appeal.91  The Supreme Court has held that 
85. Tavares v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting David
v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998)).
86. Jackson v. United States, 495 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1974).
87. See, e.g., Crimson v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[E]rror in
the admission of testimony at trial is an improper ground upon which to base a claim
for post-conviction relief in a proceeding under s[ection] 2255.”); Kelly v. United
States, 350 F.2d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that a petitioner’s attacks on
admissibility of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence to establish the
petitioner’s mens rea were suited for direct appeal and not reviewable pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Tarbell, 728 F.3d 122, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2013) (“When
faced with a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, . . . [the
Court of Appeals] may: (1) decline to hear the claim, permitting the appellant to
raise the issue as part of a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255; (2) remand the claim to the district court for necessary factfinding;
or (3) decide the claim on the record before . . . [it].” (citation omitted)).
89. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1341 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Collateral
relief is available to Oliver under section 2255 only if any legal error in taking
Oliver’s guilty plea is ‘jurisdictional, constitutional, or is a fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” (citation omitted)).
90. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 98 F.3d 1052, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 1996) (“An
instructional error must be of ‘constitutional dimensions’ to warrant post-conviction
relief . . . .  That requires a showing that ‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected 
the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process, not merely [that] the 
instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned.’” (citation 
omitted)); Merrill v. United States, 599 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1979) (“Generally, an 
improper jury instruction is not cognizable in a s[ection] 2255 proceeding unless it is 
‘of constitutional magnitude or “inherently results in a complete miscarriage of 
justice.”’” (citation omitted)).   
91. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2014).
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“[t]o establish actual innocence, [a] petitioner must demonstrate that, 
‘in light of all the evidence,’ ‘it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted him.’”92 
The final remedy available to a federal prisoner is executive 
clemency.93  The Supreme Court has held that “[c]lemency, while not 
required by the Due Process Clause, was a significant, traditionally 
available remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice when judicial 
process was exhausted.”94  Historically, pardon and commutation 
decisions have been outside the scope of judicial review.95   The goal 
of this executive remedy “is to grant clemency as a matter of grace, 
thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not 
comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing 
determinations.”96 
Throughout the post-trial phase, a petitioner must always be wary 
of the doctrine of waiver.97 Certain types of claims not raised on 
direct appeal are considered waived and may not be reviewed by the 
court later pursuant to a Section 2255 motion.98  Generally, errors of 
constitutional dimension cannot be waived, but non-fundamental 
errors are subject to waiver.99  This doctrine is important, as the 
purpose of it is to balance two opposing, but compelling, judicial 
92. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (citing Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 327–28 (1995)).
93. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . shall have the power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”).
94. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 278 (1998).
95. Id. at 276 (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)).
96. Id. at 280–81.
97. See generally George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More
Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977) (analyzing waiver in criminal
procedure).
98. See Jerald J. Director, Annotation, Consideration of, or Failure to Raise or
Consider, Question on Appeal from Conviction or on Postconviction Remedy, as
Precluding Its Consideration on Subsequent Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28
U.S.C.A. § 2255, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 724 (1972); see also, e.g., Knight v. United States,
37 F.3d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Normally, failure to raise a constitutional issue on
direct appeal will bar raising the issue on collateral attack unless the defendant can
show cause for the failure and actual prejudice.”); Ingram v. United States, 299 F.2d
351, 352 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that a collateral proceeding is not a direct
substitute for an appeal); Sanders v. United States, 230 F.2d 127, 127 (4th Cir. 1956)
(holding that because the Petitioner failed to raise his current claims on direct appeal,
he was unable to use them to collaterally attack his sentence).
99. See Hunter v. United States, 160 F.3d 1109, 1115 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Relief is not
available in a section 2255 proceeding for a claim of nonconstitutional, sentencing-
guideline error when that error was procedurally defaulted through the failure to
bring a direct appeal.”).
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interests: maintaining the finality of criminal judgments, while 
affording those rare criminal defendants who are innocent or 
convicted on insufficient evidence the right to collaterally challenge 
their convictions.100 
III. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
A. Timing
There does not seem to be a logical location to raise the proposed 
challenge to scientific evidence.  The two main ways to attack a 
conviction, on direct appeal and collaterally, do not provide a 
meaningful way for a petitioner, years later after these remedies have 
already been exhausted, to have a court take another look at the 
scientific evidence.101  In many cases, direct appeal could be too soon 
after the conviction for the relevant scientific community to change 
the way it sees the underlying scientific evidence.102  A challenge 
made pursuant to Section 2255 also has a short time-period, with only 
a year-long statute of limitations.103  It seems likely that new 
scientific evidence in certain fields would take longer than one year 
to emerge from the alleged date that the error occurred, as that would 
be either the trial date or the pretrial Daubert hearing date.  Because 
there is not a natural place in the currently established post-trial 
phase, this Comment proposes a new solution.104 
B. Due Process: The Basis for the Proposed Procedural
Mechanism
Due Process, as established by the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution,105 and as applied to the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,106 gives this “problem” constitutional dimension: 
Americans are afforded the right to due process of law.107  The 
importance and meaning of due process of law is summarized well by 
Justice Stewart in Hawkins v. United States: “Any rule that impedes 
100. Dix, supra note 97, at 195.
101. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2012) (providing the time limits for filing an appeal in the
federal courts); see also infra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that a § 2255
challenge is subject to a one-year statute of limitations).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012).
104. See infra Part IV.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
107. Id.
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the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of 
justice.”108 
The precise definition of due process of law is difficult to pin 
down.109  For example, in Davidson v. New Orleans, Justice Miller 
described the essence of due process in a workable manner: 
But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any 
definition which would be at once perspicuous, 
comprehensive, and satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think, 
in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an 
important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual 
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases 
presented for decision shall require, with the reasoning on 
which such decisions may be founded.110  
Using Justice Miller’s definition, one can see that the given 
definition of “due process of law” can change with the times.111  
Furthermore, Hurtado v. California suggests that due process of law 
“refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the 
legislative powers conferred upon congress by the constitution of the 
United States.”112  The origin of this right may permit the current 
government to define the bounds of due process “exercised within the 
limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles 
of the common law.”113 
Due process of law, then, is the ever-evolving procedural fairness 
and justice for every criminal defendant.114  With that workable 
definition of due process of law in mind, it is easy to see how the 
privilege to have a trial that is based upon valid scientific evidence 
would be derived from basic due process of law principles.  
IV. PROPOSAL: A PROCEDURAL MECHANISM TO FIX THE
PROBLEM
A. The Governmental Body
The governmental body presiding over the proposed procedural 
mechanism would be derived from the executive branch, as opposed 
108. 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
109. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533–34 (1884).
110. 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
111. See id.
112. 110 U.S. at 535.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 535–36.
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to the judicial.115  This body would preside over a hearing, acting as a 
last resort remedy available to a petitioner serving a sentence 
imposed using junk science.116  Removing the body from the grasp of 
the judiciary would serve two purposes: first, a diverse group of 
people could bring a fresh perspective to an old case,117 and second, it 
would create consistency with the other executive branch checks to 
the judiciary.118 
1. The Board Make-up
The proposed make-up of the board would not be limited to 
attorneys: it would include laypeople.  Similar to a parole board,119 
this board would be comprised of three members appointed for 
several year terms by the President, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.120  No specific qualifications or disqualifications for 
membership would be statutorily prescribed.121   
For example, the 2017 make-up of the parole board includes one 
attorney, one politician, and one former police officer.122  The 
professional experiences that the members had prior to their 
appointments create a diverse background of approaches to and 
perspectives on the legal system that reinforce the Commission’s 
mission “to promote public safety and strive for justice and fairness 
in the exercise of its authority to release and revoke offenders under 
its jurisdiction.”123   
In this case, the members of the scientific evidence review board 
would come from diverse backgrounds as the parole board 
115. See infra Section IV.A.2.
116. See infra Section IV.A.1.
117. See infra Section IV.A.1.
118. See infra Section IV.A.2.
119. The federal parole system underwent a massive change in 1987, discontinuing the
current parole system.  COHEN, supra note 73, § 5:2.  The former system was
replaced by legislation which requires a prisoner to complete eighty-five percent of
his sentence before becoming eligible for release.  Prison Time Surges for Federal
Inmates, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re
search-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/11/prison-time-surges-for-federal-inmates.
The U.S. Parole Commission still exists to serve as the parole board for those prison-
ers convicted prior to November 1, 1987.  Parole Commission, FED. REG., https://w
ww.federalregister.gov/agencies/parole-commission (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
120. COHEN, supra note 73, § 5:2.
121. Id.
122. Meet the Chairman, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/uspc/meet-chairman
(last updated Feb. 8, 2016); Meet the Commissioners, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/uspc/meet-commissioners (last updated Sept. 3, 2015).
123. Meet the Chairman, supra note 122; Meet the Commissioners, supra note 122; About
the Commission, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/uspc/about-commission-
0 (last updated Mar. 3, 2016).
2018 Integrating Daubert into the Post-Trial Phase 309 
encourages.124  Moreover, the President could appoint members who 
have backgrounds in science, similarly to how the President may 
appoint cabinet members based on relevant professional 
backgrounds.125  
2. The Executive Checks on the Judiciary
This proposed body would extend from the executive branch, 
similar to the United States Parole Commission, as an important 
check on the judicial system.126  In the federal parole system, the 
Commission has the power to grant parole, despite the court’s 
independent determination to put an offender away for a set period of 
time.127   
The United States Constitution does not contain an express 
provision prohibiting “the officials of one branch of government from 
exercising functions of the other branches.”128  In fact, Justice Warren 
once observed: 
This ‘separation of powers’ was obviously not instituted 
with the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency.  
It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against 
tyranny.  For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a 
given policy can be implemented only by a combination of 
legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive 
implementation, no man or group of men will be able to 
impose its unchecked will.129 
For example, sentencing is not inherently or exclusively a judicial 
function.130  Under this rationale, the parole board was designed to 
serve as a permissible, additional check on the judicial power to 
restrain an individual’s liberty.131  Just like sentencing is not 
124. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
125. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Appointments
Clause of United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, cl. 2, 59 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1
(2011).  The presidential appointment power is derived from Article II, section 2,
clause 2 of the United States Constitution, coined the “Appointments Clause.”  Id.
126. See id.
127. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.2(a)–(b) (2007).
128. Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1210 (3d Cir. 1983).
129. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
130. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41–42 (1916).
131. See Geraghty, 719 F.2d at 1211–12 (“As we emphasized earlier, Addonizio reiterated
this three-way sharing of responsibility in which Congress sets the statutory 
maximum sentence, the courts impose sentences within those limits, and the
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inherently designated to one branch, the validity of a conviction also 
should not be inherently designated to one branch.132 
B. The Workable Standard
Finally, it is necessary to determine first, the circumstances under 
which a petitioner may bring a claim before this board,133 and second, 
the standard under which the board may evaluate the claim.134  First, 
the petitioner must meet four elements in his petition before he may 
be afforded the privilege of being heard by the proposed body, and if 
he fails, the petition will be summarily dismissed.135  Next, the 
petitioner has a full hearing before the proposed body.136  Finally, the 
petitioner’s remedy will be selected by the proposed body and 
properly administered.137 
1. Petitioner’s Prima Facie Showing
In order to bring a claim pursuant to this proposed mechanism, 
there are elements that a petitioner would have to show in order to be 
afforded the right to a hearing before the board.138  The petitioner 
would have to make a prima facie showing of four elements in order 
to be granted a hearing before the board.139 
First, the petitioner would have to exhaust all post-trial remedies 
and collateral attacks.140  The waiver doctrine of post-trial procedure 
is still relevant and would still apply in this stage of the petitioner’s 
proceeding.141  It is important to recall the waiver’s justification, 
which is to maintain the integrity of the finality of a court’s final 
judgment.142  Therefore, waiver applies, and this challenge could only 
be made after all other judicial remedies have been exhausted.143 
Second, the petitioner would have to make a showing that science 
has changed from the generally accepted standard under which he 
Commission establishes release dates within the eligibility range of the courts’ 
sentences.”).  
132. See id.
133. See infra Section IV.B.1.
134. See infra Section IV.B.2.
135. See infra Section IV.B.1.
136. See infra Section IV.B.2.
137. See infra Section IV.B.3.
138. See infra notes 140–53 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 154–56 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Section II.B.
141. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Section II.B.
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was convicted to the contemporary approach.144  The petitioner 
would first have to show the baseline: testimony from experts at the 
time of his hearing recorded in the transcripts.  If there was not a 
Daubert-like hearing at trial, the petitioner would have to provide 
scientific studies, contemporaneous to his conviction date, that reflect 
the general opinion of the relevant scientific community at that time.  
Then, the petitioner would discuss in his petition what testimony he 
hopes to elicit at the hearing to show that science has, in fact, evolved 
in some substantive way since the date of his conviction that could 
materially call into question the legitimacy of his conviction or 
sentencing.    
The third and fourth elements would be modeled off of the 
Strickland v. Washington effectiveness-of-counsel standard.145  To 
satisfy the third element, the petitioner would be required to show 
that the evidence at issue was material either to the validity of his 
conviction or sentence imposed.  This is similar to the first prong of 
the Strickland test, counsel’s deficient performance.146  To show 
deficient performance of counsel, a petitioner must show that 
“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”147  
Similarly, the petitioner in his prima facie case would have to show 
that the scientific evidence in his trial was material to his case and 
that its faultiness deprived him of his Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to due process of law. 
The “materiality” standard would be borrowed from Brady v. 
Maryland.148  In that case, the Supreme Court required that for every 
accusation that the State withheld discovery, the petitioner must show 
that the evidence that was withheld was “material either to [the] guilt 
or to [the] punishment” of the petitioner.149  This threshold showing 
of materiality would work in the instant situation: the petitioner 
would have to show that the introduction of this shoddy science was 
144. See supra Section II.A.
145. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that to determine whether a petitioner wins a
challenge to the constitutionality of his attorney’s performance, the petitioner must
first show that his counsel acted in a constitutionally deficient manner, and second,
that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of his trial).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”).
149. See id.
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material either to his guilt or to his punishment, just as Brady 
requires.150  
Finally, the fourth showing would be akin to Strickland’s prejudice 
prong.151  Strickland requires that the deficient performance be so 
serious “as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result 
is unreliable.”152  In the instant situation, the petitioner also would 
have the burden of showing that this material scientific evidence was 
so seriously wrong that it deprived the petitioner of a fair trial, 
rendering the result unreliable.153 
The petitioner would then have to make a prima facie case of the 
four elements in order to be granted a hearing.154  If the petitioner 
failed to meet any of these four elements, then his petition would be 
summarily denied.155  The rationale behind this screening process is 
to allow the board to review only serious claims and to weed out the 
frivolous ones, to preserve the finality of criminal opinions, and to 
reserve collateral review for only the most serious of cases.156  
Therefore, this preliminary screening function would allow for only 
the strongest of cases to enter the hearing phase.  
2. The Board’s Evaluation Standard
The petitioner’s hearing before the board would resemble that of a 
Daubert hearing and would borrow many of the portions of this 
pretrial proceeding.  As stated previously, in a Daubert hearing, the 
judge is the gatekeeper who decides what evidence may be admitted 
based on a variety of factors.157  Similar to the judge’s role in a 
Daubert hearing, the board would have a majority vote to determine 
the outcome of the validity of the evidence.  
As discussed previously, in a Daubert hearing, it is incumbent upon 
the proponent of the expert witness to show, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, first that the expert is qualified to testify as an expert, 
and second, that the witness’s opinions are both relevant and 
reliable.158  In the proposed hearing, the board would require the 
150. See id.
151. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See supra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
156. See ERIC J. MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION AND
PRACTICE § 7:5, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (noting that there is a
“strong interest of both the parties and society as a whole in speedy resolution of
criminal cases”).
157. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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petitioner to bear this burden.159  Once the burden is met, the expert 
may testify as to the validity of the science currently supporting the 
petitioner’s conviction or sentence.  
This proposed hearing, like Daubert, would be adversarial in 
nature.160  The defense would be permitted to present expert 
testimony related to the validity of the science, and the State could 
recall an expert or find a new one to support its position; this 
structure would prevent the defense from any attempt to buy out an 
expert witness, and would create a two-sided picture for the proposed 
body to consider.161 
3. The Remedy
If the petitioner is successful in the pleading and hearing, the 
remedy would be within the board’s discretion to impose.  The 
options from which the board could choose would be the same 
remedies available upon a successful petition pursuant to Section 
2255, which include immediate release, a new trial, a vacated 
sentence, a set aside sentence, or a corrected sentence.162  
If the petitioner is unsuccessful, the case would return to the 
judiciary to address any residual due process concerns, just as it 
would in the parole system.163  Like probation or parole revocation, 
the proposed conviction review is not a stage of a “criminal 
prosecution.”164  However, because a petitioner may be similarly 
subject to a loss of liberty as a result of this proposal, a denial of due 
process should be grounds for judicial review.165 
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Randall Adams sat in prison unable to find a remedy for his 
unconstitutional conviction.166  He was fortunate to have received 
interest in his case and an excellent pro bono team to help find him a 
159. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
160. See Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert’s Debut: The Supreme Court, the Economics of
Scientific Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 53 (1995).
161. The adversarial bias that can result from only allowing one party to present evidence
at a Daubert hearing may be harmful to the party who cannot bring in an expert.  See
David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of
the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 458 (2008).
162. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
163. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82, 782 n.4 (1973).
164. Id. at 782.
165. See id.
166. See supra notes 1–21 and accompanying text.
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suitable remedy.167  While Texas allowed Adams a procedural 
protection to move for a new trial upon grounds independent of Dr. 
Death’s testimony, the federal system lacks any procedural protection 
for a defendant incarcerated based on suspect science.168  For a 
country proud of its devotion to science and technology, our judicial 
system should recognize that, as science changes, convictions, too, 
may change.  A grave constitutional issue has gone without remedy 
long enough, and it is time for our judicial system to afford one. 
167. See supra notes 13–14, 17–18 and accompanying text.
168. See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that
Brady violations and failure of the State to disclose that it knew of perjured witness
testimony warranted a new trial for Adams).  After a state court habeas proceeding,
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas made findings of fact and conclusions of law
recommending that a new trial be granted.  Id.
